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Abstract 
 
Over the past twenty years, the European Union has been increasingly active in promoting democracy, and consequently 
so has academic literature on EU democracy assistance, culminating in a vast and diverse collection of concepts, theories 
and empirical findings. However, despite decades of research and practice, there is yet much confusion about the actual 
substance of democracy being promoted. In other words, what does the EU promote? Following more recent academic 
research on the subject, this article provides a general academic overview in search of consensus on the substance of 
EU democracy assistance and how to understand it. After all, answering this question provides a benchmark against 
which the EU’s commitment can be assessed. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Academic literature has elaborated on the 
impact of the different EU democracy 
promotion instruments (e.g. Warkotsch 2008; 
Portela 2010; Kotzian, Knodt & Urdze 2011); the 
differing types of actions in promoting 
democracy between international actors (Cf. 
Huber 2015); the linkages between democracy 
and other interests, e.g. trade, security and 
stability (e.g. Dandashly 2018); and whether the 
European Union (EU) could be considered to be 
a normative, civilian or rationalist actor when it 
comes to democracy assistance (e.g. Youngs 
2004a, Pace 2009; Sheahan et al. 2010). 
However, for long literature has failed to 
develop clear concepts and typologies upon 
which the substance of democracy assistance 
itself could be properly analysed. Only more 
recently there has been some attention towards 
the development of clear typologies, upon 
which the substance of EU democracy can be 
mapped and effectively explained (e.g. Wetzel 
& Orbie 2015; Wetzel, Orbie & Bossuyt 2017; 
Bush 2015; Axyonova & Bossuyt 2016). 
 
Fundamentally, ‘democracy’ and ‘democracy 
assistance’ remain contested and elusive 
concepts (cf. Gallie 1956) and their substance 
differs according to a classical, republican, 
liberal, direct, elitist, pluralist, socialist, 
deliberative, cosmopolitan (cf. Held 2006; 
Hobson & Kurki 2012; Kurki 2015), or even 
authoritarian conceptualisation (see Wetzel, 
Orbie & Bossuyt 2015). Hence, there seems to be 
a lack of any conceptual clarity in terms of the 
definition of democracy itself (Smith 2003, 
Herrero 2009, De Ridder & Kochenov 2011). This 
renders it difficult to delineate the clear 
substance of EU democracy assistance – not just 
for academics, but also for practitioners. 
Indeed, it leaves little basis for the practitioners 
in the field for choosing between, and echoing 
Carothers (1997), ‘the further an aid official 
would delve into the literature, the more he or 
she would be convinced either that academics 
have achieved no greater certainty on the 
subject than have practitioners.  
 
Therefore, as the body of knowledge on EU 
democracy assistance has grown exponentially, 
it is a good practice to take a step back and 
critically reflect upon what is known and more 
importantly, look for a common core from where 
further insights can be developed. In other 
words, through an exploration of scholarly 
discussions, the aim of this article is to represent 
the general consensus within literature. Indeed, 
by providing a clear overview on the consensus 
on the substance of EU democracy assistance 
    
 
 
 
 
 
2 
within academic literature, this article hopes to 
narrow the gap between academia and the 
policy field. Also, it hopes to better align a 
benchmark against which the EU’s commitment 
can be assessed. Importantly, by no means 
‘consensus’ is understood here as a ‘unanimous 
agreement’, as this is impossible given the 
different scholarly traditions (including, but not   
limited to, critical, realist or constructivist 
research).  Instead, consensus is explained as a 
‘common denominator’ on which researchers 
have agreed throughout literature, even though 
this might be slim. This paper shows that 
consensus can be found when different 
arguments, from diverse academic researchers, 
throughout the years, all point to the same 
direction. 
 
 In its analysis of the academic literature on the 
‘substance’ of EU democracy assistance, this 
paper refers both to the substance of 
‘democracy’ and to the substance of 
‘assistance’. In other words, the argument goes 
that, in assessing literary consensus on the 
substance of EU democracy assistance, one 
should first look for agreement on what type of 
democracy the EU promotes (cf. clarity on the 
object of research), before looking at how this 
type of democracy assistance comes to be. In 
other words, first of all this article will seek to 
convey the scholarly consensus on the object of 
study, namely how literature agrees on what 
kind of democracy the EU promotes. After all, 
‘one who seeks to understand and to assess the 
structure of political life, must deliberately 
probe the conventions governing those 
concepts’ (Connolly 1993). In a second step, this 
article will then look to analyse the substance of 
this certain type of democracy that the EU seeks 
to promote in terms of three interconnected 
dimensions (cf. Wetzel, Orbie & Bossuyt 2017): 
(a) conceptual—underlying models informing 
democracy assistance activities; (b) discursive—
frames used by democracy promoters; and (c) 
implementation— emphasis of priorities pursued 
by actors. In other words, for the second part, 
this paper aims to outline scholarly consensus on 
how the EU thinks about assisting democracy, 
how the EU talks about assisting democracy and 
how the EU does democracy assistance. 
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   1.  
 
The EU and 
liberal 
democracy 
assistance: 
conceptual 
obscurity? 
 
The substance of ‘democracy’ could differ 
according to a classical, republican, liberal, 
direct, elitist, pluralist, socialist, deliberative, 
or cosmopolitan conceptualization (Kurki 2015; 
Held 2006; Schmitter & Karl). To give a few 
examples1, a classical reading of democracy 
entails the ‘institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realizes the 
common good by making the people themselves 
decide on issues through the election of 
individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will’ (Schumpeter, 1976). On the 
other hand, a cosmopolitan reading, due to the 
deepening global interlinkages, would 
emphasise more the need to create new 
political institutions which would coexist with 
the system of states, but which would override 
                                             
1. These examples are merely illustrative. They serve to illustrate that democracy can be read through different lenses. By no means is this list exhaustive 
or do these examples explain the further substance of EU democracy assistance. 
states in clearly defined spheres of activity. In 
other words, it would entrench and develop 
democratic institutions at regional and global 
levels as a necessary complement to those at the 
level of the nation-state (see Patomäki & 
Teivainen 2004). Also, deliberative democracy 
puts more emphasis on the transformation of 
private preferences via a process of deliberation 
into positions that can withstand public scrutiny 
and test (Held 2006). As such, other than through 
representative measures, it seeks the direct 
input of the citizenry through deliberative polls, 
e-government or referenda (see Warren 2008). 
Furthermore, even within each category there is 
contestation. For example, the liberal notion of 
democracy can be understood differently either 
through a procedural versus cultural (cf. Kurki 
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2010), or through a Lockean versus Dahlian 
reading (cf. Dahl 1989, Jahn 2012, Huber 2015). 
Namely, according to Dahl, democracy should 
primarily include a political reading of freedom, 
meaning that democracy can only be reached 
when citizens enjoy effective participation and 
voting equality, when equality is extended to all 
people within the state (cf. inclusiveness) and 
when they have an enlightened understanding 
and control of the agenda. In other words, 
democracy assistance should entail the 
promotion of certain key liberal democratic 
procedures—encompassing electoral processes 
and institutionalisation of rule of law, freedoms 
of expression, press and association (Kurki 
2010). On the other hand, other than just 
political freedoms, John Locke also emphasized 
economic freedoms (cf. protection of private 
property). According to his reasoning, the 
extension of the right to private property – and 
the rights that follow from this – to all citizens 
provides the basis for individual and political 
freedom. As such, democracy assistance 
policies must aim to support a wider distribution 
of private property in society (Jahn 2012). 
Then, even liberal democracy has no singular 
meaning, but is a ‘cluster concept’ which can 
be understood in different ways (Freeden 1996; 
Kurki 2010).  
 
Conceptual frameworks define and reflect our 
value systems and thus ideological orientations. 
Hence, a different understanding of democracy 
might significantly define our views of how 
society is structured, how democracies 
function, and it may even define the normative 
justifications for democracy. Where does this 
leave the EU? What type of democracy does the 
EU predominantly support and what does this 
tell us about how the EU thinks society should be 
structured?  
It is difficult to find clear consensus here. 
Indeed, the substance of EU democracy 
promotion is in various ways described to be 
more ‘neoliberal’ in character (Hout 2010; 
Reynaert 2011, 2015), ‘electoral’ (Youngs 2003; 
Del Biondo 2011a), ‘institutional’ (Manning & 
Malbrough 2012), ‘participatory’ (Freyburg et al 
2015) or ‘representative’ (Cardwell 2011).  
 
However, sticking to the objective of this paper 
– which is to find consensus – it could be stated 
that, in general terms, the EU pursues ‘some 
form’ of liberal democracy (see Schmitter 1995, 
Pridham 2005, Huber 2008; Pace 2011) that 
remains ‘vague and fuzzy’ (Kurki 2010, 2012; 
Ayers 2008; Bridoux & Kurki 2015). As such, it 
could be noted that there is agreement that the 
EU sees democracy as a relatively openly 
defined, broadly liberal but potentially more 
pluralistic concept (see Kurki 2015). Wetzel and 
Orbie (2015) also define this as ‘embedded 
democracy’ (cf. infra), meaning that while at its 
core it focuses on liberal democratic notions, 
liberties, rights and elections, the EU also 
emphasizes the social and economic contexts of 
democratisation. 
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   2. 
 
 
 
Dissecting the  
substance 
a. How does the EU think about 
democracy assistance?   
 
It is generally agreed that the substance of EU 
democracy assistance best aligns with a liberal 
conception of democracy, albeit broadly and 
vaguely defined. As previously stated, Kurki 
(2015) and Wetzel & Orbie (2011, 2015) 
respectively define this as ‘fuzzy’ or 
‘embedded’ democracy assistance. However, 
how can we better understand such fuzzy 
democracy assistance? What are the underlying 
dimensions that drive such vague 
conceptualisation? How does ‘fuzzy liberalism’ 
inform the EU narrative? How does it show in the 
EU democracy assistance projects? Therefore, 
in this section, we will seek a more-in-depth 
understanding of what such fuzzy liberalism 
might entail. It seeks to structure the scholarly 
consensus with regards to what underlying 
models inform such vague conception, how this 
becomes clear in the EU narrative, and how it 
can be identified in it democracy assistance 
projects. 
 
This section aims to outline what literature 
believes to be the underlying conceptions that 
influence the EU’s thinking on democracy 
assistance. More specifically, two central 
arguments will be zoomed, as evident in 
literature: the democracy-development nexus 
and the functionalist approach to the EU 
integration process. 
 
Attempts to delve into conceptions of the EU’s 
democracy assistance have stemmed from the 
debate on whether democracy should follow 
development, or vice versa – also referred to as 
the democracy-development nexus. The 2015 UN 
SDGs best exemplify these different views: the 
SDGs primarily address ‘developmental goals’ 
such as fighting poverty and hunger, improving 
health and education, clean water and 
sanitation, economic growth and infrastructure, 
etc. On the other hand, there is also some focus 
on more ‘political’ or democratic goals, such as 
the necessity of rule of law, strong institutions 
and participatory decision-making at all levels. 
Notably, however, the SDGs make no mention of 
‘democracy’. Again, it seems, ‘democracy’ is a 
contested concept. Nevertheless, while 
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‘democracy’ may not be named as such, its 
underlying objectives are clear. 
 
Indeed, the link between democracy and 
development is controversial and much 
debated, both in academic and policy circles. 
Taking stock of the literature on this topic, it is 
unclear if and to what extent democracy and 
development are reconcilable goals that can be 
pursued simultaneously, or whether one should 
be prioritized over the other (Collier 2009; 
Carothers 2010; Nega 2011). For example, 
several studies have shown that democratic 
countries outperform autocratic ones in terms 
of socio-economic development, hinting at the 
need to prioritise democracy (e.g. Halperin, 
Siegle & Weinstein 2004), while others pose the 
opposite (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Yang 
2011). According to the developmentalist ideal 
type, the priority is to promote economic 
development, which will eventually entail the 
creation of a middle class and bottom-up 
pressures for democratisation (Carothers 2009). 
In contrast, democratisers posit that donors 
should first and foremost focus on democratic 
processes, even if this may hinder effective 
development policies in the short term 
(Halperin, Siegle & Weinstein 2004; Nega 2011). 
According to Carothers (2009), the EU is a 
developmental actor when it comes to 
democracy assistance, meaning that the EU 
values a non-confrontational approach to 
democracy, emphasising an incremental, long-
term change in a wide range of political and 
socio-economic sectors. This is further 
exemplified in literature – where it is shown 
that the EU has favoured development over 
democracy (Del Biondo 2011a; Saltnes 2017) – 
and more specifically, this is made visible 
through calls for the EU to act in a more political 
and confrontational manner in its approach to 
democracy abroad (Youngs 2003, 2008; 
Carothers 2009, 2015; Hout 2010; Kurki 2012). 
 
Also, the developmental argument to EU 
democracy promotion could be linked to the 
functionalist logic of the European integration 
project. According to the functionalist logic of 
EU integration, EU integration did not rely on 
grand normative ideals, but on a ‘depoliticised 
and rational’ expert vision for a more peaceful 
Europe (Radaelli 1999, as quoted in Kurki 
2011b). More specifically, EU post-war 
development was fundamentally based on 
depoliticising cooperation, prioritising step-by-
step socio-economic integration. Considering 
that EU external policies are a product of 
internal developments, the functionalist logic 
also influences EU’s thinking of promoting 
democracy. Indeed, according to the 
functionalist logic, democracy is not a ‘finished 
product’, but a development in process. It 
involves the institutionalisation of structures to 
foster both political and economic transparency 
and accountability (Zack-Williams 2001).  
 
For example, this is in particular illustrated 
through the application of ‘the embedded 
democracy’ framework (cf. Merkel 2004; Linz & 
Stepan 1996), as adapted from by Wetzel & 
Orbie (2011, 2015). Departing from a ‘liberal’ 
understanding of democracy, the embedded 
democracy framework is a tool to analyse the 
substance of the EU’s democracy promotion. The 
framework allows one to conceptually keep 
apart EU support of democracy’s core 
institutions from democracy-enhancing external 
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conditions. The core institutions (also known as 
‘partial regimes’) include a democratic 
electoral regime, political rights of 
participation, civil rights, horizontal 
accountability, and ‘the guarantee that the 
effective power to govern lies in the hands of 
democratically elected representatives’. 
  
The democracy-enhancing external conditions 
relate to issues of stateness, state 
administrative capacity, civil society, and social 
and economic requisites. These have an 
influence on the quality of democracy but ‘are 
not defining components of the democratic 
regime itself’ (Wetzel & Orbie 2011, 2015). 
Through the application of the framework, it is 
shown that the EU highly values the process of 
improving the ‘external contextual factors’ 
necessary for democracy.  
 
More specifically, it is shown that the EU values 
‘stateness’ (cf. ability of the state to pursue the 
monopoly of legitimate physical force), ‘state 
administrative capacity’ (cf. anti-corruption, 
good governance), an ‘active civil society’ and 
‘social and economic requisites’ as essential 
elements to democratic development abroad 
(see also Magen, Risse & McFaul 2009; Kurki 
2010; Del Biondo 2011a; Timmer et al. 2014; 
Wetzel, Orbie & Bossuyt 2017). In other words, 
in the EU’s conception, democracy is thought to 
develop through enhancing the ‘external 
conditions’.  
 
Although in its external policies the EU is guided 
by several normative principles, namely 
sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, 
sustainable development and good governance 
(Lucarelli & Manners 2006; Manners 2008), as 
this section has indicated, the value of liberal 
democracy can at times compete with the value 
of sustainable development in the sense of 
prioritisation (cf. democracy-development 
nexus) (see Del Biondo & Orbie 2014; Saltnes 
2017). Hence, while the EU values liberal 
democracy, the thought of achieving this is 
guided by a developmentalist and functional 
approach favouring stability and socio-economic 
development over confrontation. This brings us 
to the next section, how does the EU actually 
talk about democracy?  
 
b. How does the EU talk about 
democracy assistance?  
 
This section outlines the EU narrative resulting 
from the underlying EU conception of democracy 
that is informed by a somewhat liberal, but 
developmental understanding. More specifically, 
this section first of all briefly outlines the EU 
discourse in policy documents and its 
consequences, before demonstrating the 
scholarly agreement on the basis of the narrative 
regarding ‘democratic- and good governance’.  
In short, while the general tone of the 
democracy assistance discourse could come 
across as highly normative and political in 
nature, the EU has sought to depoliticise its 
democracy assistance through technocratic and 
uncontroversial measures. 
 
Despite contestation, ‘democracy’ is a 
universally recognised ideal and its values are 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights and its legal basis further developed in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Furthermore, in 2005 the international 
community, represented by 172 states, 
including all EU member states, reaffirmed 
their commitment to that covenant and 
approved a UN General Assembly resolution, 
which defined the ‘essential elements of 
democracy’, namely:  
“respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association 
and peaceful assembly and of expression and 
opinion, and the right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives, to vote and to 
be elected at genuine periodic free elections by 
universal and equal suffrage and by secret 
ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the people, as well as a pluralistic 
system of political parties and organisations, 
respect for the rule of law, the separation of 
powers, the independence of the judiciary, 
transparency and accountability in public 
administration, and free, independent and 
pluralistic media” (UN 2005). 
 
However, despite calls to define and 
consolidate the EU’s democracy assistance 
agenda (e.g. European Parliament [EP] 2018) – 
and even proposals to use the UN-agreed 
‘essential elements of democracy’ as a 
reference point (e.g. Meyer-Resende 2009) – the 
EU has not yet adopted any official definition of 
democracy as the basis for its democracy 
assistance efforts abroad. For example, the 
2009 Council Conclusions on ‘Democracy 
Support in the EU’s External Relations’ state 
that ‘there is no single model of democracy’, 
other than that democracy has evolved into a 
universal value. In other words, ‘democracy’ is 
an aspiration that is not yet defined (Timmer et 
al. 2014). 
The EU narrative on democracy assistance rests 
on more general assumptions, in that 
‘democracy’ is based upon the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the principle of non-discrimination, 
and the prerequisite of the ability of men and 
women to participate on equal terms in political 
life and in decision-making (European 
Commission [EC] 1995, Council 2009). As such, 
‘democracy’ should be adapted to each 
country’s history, cultures and particular ways of 
thinking; it should include a special focus on the 
role of elected representatives and political 
parties and institutions, independent media and 
civil society; and it should take into account the 
full electoral cycle and not focus on ad hoc 
electoral support only (EC 1998, 2009; Council 
2009). 
 
 In a more recent publication for the Southern 
Mediterranean, the EC posited three elements as 
the basis of democracy assistance: (i) 
democratic transformation and institution- 
building, with a particular focus on fundamental 
freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the 
judiciary and the fight against corruption; (ii) a 
stronger partnership with the people, with 
specific emphasis on support to civil society and 
on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and 
people-to-people contacts with a particular 
focus on the young; (iii) sustainable and inclusive 
growth and economic development especially 
support to Small and Medium Enterprises, 
vocational and educational training, improving 
health and education systems and development 
of the poorer regions (EC 2011a). Finally, in the 
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2015 Council Conclusions on ‘the action plan on 
Human Rights and democracy 2015-2019’ the EU 
also highlights how it aims to safeguard 
democracy. Namely, the stated focus lies on 
delivering a comprehensive support to public 
institutions (cf. Elections Management Bodies, 
Parliamentary institutions and justice 
systems),invigorating civil society, protecting 
civil and political rights, and fostering a 
comprehensive agenda to promote economic 
improvements – e.g. through pursuing robust 
trade and investment policies (Council 2015).   
 
Furthermore, over the years, the EU has 
expanded its ‘democratic vocabulary’, 
including  ‘pluralistic democracy’, ‘democracy 
governance’, ‘democratisation’, ‘democracy-
building’, ‘European democracy’, and ‘deep 
democracy’ thereby indicating a move towards 
a more substantive conception of democracy, 
not necessarily related to the state (Börzel & 
Hackenesh 2013). 
 
For example, ‘democratic governance’ includes 
more than just governance, in that it also 
emphasises transparency, accountability, and 
stakeholder participation. It spans a broad 
range of issues, including managing public 
affairs in a transparent, accountable, 
participative and equitable manner showing due 
regard for human rights, the rule of law, gender 
equality, human security, access to information 
and promotion of sustainable economic growth 
and social cohesion. It extends the aims of 
democratisation into the sphere of resource 
management (EC 1998, 2009). In other words, it 
aims to empower all actors in making public 
policies to improve the democratic quality of 
decision-making processes. Also, ‘deep 
democracy’ expresses an understanding that 
democracy is not merely a matter of holding free 
and fair elections, but entails building the right 
institutions and external conditions (cf. supra) – 
including “an independent judiciary, a thriving 
free press, a dynamic civil society and all other 
characteristics of a mature functioning 
democracy” and ensuring “inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth and development, 
without which democracy will not take root” (EC 
2011d). Formulated as a response to the Arab 
Spring, the concept of ‘deep democracy’ is 
informed by previous criticism on the EU 
democracy promotion and emphasises the EU’s 
acceptance of the need for a more 
differentiated and context-specific approach to 
democracy assistance (Bossuyt 2013, Teti et al. 
2013). 
 
As such, “the EU has in its democracy support 
moved away from the perceived ‘hyper-
liberalism’ of the US towards a diversity-
accommodating and complexity-appreciating 
democracy support language” (Kurki 2012). This 
echoes the value of the ‘democracy-enhancing 
external conditions’ rather than ‘core 
democratic institutions’ within the ‘embedded 
democracy framework’ (cf. supra). However, 
this complexity-appreciating language generally 
equals a technical and depoliticised narrative 
(Youngs 2008; Bicchi 2009; Kurki 2011a, 2012), 
especially in more concrete policy documents 
such as the Country Strategy Papers (Del Biondo 
2011a). Other than being depoliticised, a 
technical discourse is also characterised by an 
ideal of social harmony in contrast to conflictual 
interests or aspects in society or policy areas; 
the prioritisation of the role of rational technical 
experts and rationalistic or ‘economistic’ aims;  
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an emphasis on positivist objectives and 
measurable knowledge; and a minimal 
procedural meaning of democracy (Kurki 
2011b). Indeed, ‘democracy’ is increasingly 
associated with ‘governing effectively’, as 
visible in the focus on ‘good governance’ and 
‘democratic governance’. While the 
‘democratic governance’ agenda includes 
democratic main principles of transparency, 
accountability, and participation, and while it 
generally implies a political regime based on 
the model of a liberal-democratic polity which 
protects human and civil rights combined with 
a competent, non-corrupt and accountable 
public administration (Leftwich 1993; Wetzel 
2011), in reality, it has reduced the importance 
of democratisation as an end in itself. Through 
the ‘democratic governance’ paradigm 
democracy is increasingly linked to 'output 
governance’ by stressing transparent and 
                                             
2. For the purpose of this paper, Bush’s framework should be seen to further illustrate the EUs technical and depoliticised discourse. The actual 
categorisations of democracy assistance are not always shared within literature, particularly because it remains highly debatable whether ‘elections’ in fact 
are ‘not-regime compatible’. For more information, see the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace roundtable review of Bush her book, “The Taming 
of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy does not confront dictators”: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/25/roundtable-review-of-taming-of-
democracy-assistance-pub-64226  
 
accountable government, effective institutions, 
sustainable management of the environment and 
promotion of economic growth (Del Biondo 
2011a). Thus, while the focus on governance 
initially seems to involve the promotion of both 
liberal democracy and its external conditions, 
the actual focus lays mainly at enhancing aid 
effectiveness (cf. in the EU’s support to civil 
society presented in next section), the 
effectiveness of public administration and the 
absence of fraud and corruption (Del Biondo 
2011a; Reynaert 2011).  
 
A framework developed by Sarah Bush is 
particularly useful in understanding these 
distinctions2. In her framework, Bush separates 
democracy aid according to two axes: regime-
compatible vs. not regime-compatible, and 
measurable vs. not measurable. Measurable  
 
Measurable Not measurable 
Regime-
compatible 
Business and enterprise 
Constitutions 
Good governance 
Local governance 
Women’s group 
Women’s representation 
Civic education 
Civil society 
Conflict resolution 
Humanitarian aid 
Legislative assistance 
Rule of law 
Not regime-
compatible  
Elections 
Human Rights 
Media 
Dissidents 
Political parties 
Research 
Trade Unions 
Youth 
Table 1. Substance of democracy assistance, as developed by Bush (2015) 
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democracy-assistance is characterised by clear 
and objective indicators of progress at country 
level (cf. quantifiable), e.g. through different 
national and international indices and ratings. 
Regime compatible democracy assistance is the 
type of aid that target-country leaders view as 
unlikely to threaten their imminent survival (cf. 
regime collapse or overthrow), i.e. programmes 
that support competition and mobilisation (Bush 
2015). One will find that, based on the 
definitions of Carothers (2009), measurable and 
regime-compatible aid best translates to a 
developmental approach, while not-measurable 
and not-regime compatible aid can best be 
compared to a political approach.  
 
Unsurprisingly, ‘good governance’ is both 
measurable and regime-compatible3, and 
hence, clearly demonstrates that defining 
‘democracy’ in terms of governance fits well 
into the non-confrontational developmental 
approach – as outlined in the first section.  
 
In conclusion, while the EU narrative on 
democracy in key policy documents touches 
upon all the elements within the ‘embedded 
democracy framework’ (cf. core democratic 
regimes and external conditions), the narrative 
in more targeted policy documents – e.g. 
country strategy papers – does less so. Indeed, 
as Kurki (2015) puts it: ‘while seemingly 
pluralistic, and while enabling many and 
contradictory agendas in some instances, 
fuzziness also enables and maintains a strange 
depoliticising dynamic in EU action’. For 
example, democracy is increasingly translated 
                                             
3. See also the different attributes of ‘technical discourse’ as described earlier (cf. Kurki 2011b).  
according to a ‘governance’ perspective, further 
emphasising a more technical and depoliticised 
approach. So, while the EU is found to promote 
liberal democracy in general, it is at the same 
time often accused of neglecting liberal 
democracy’s core values, including in its 
concrete democracy promotion activities’ 
(Wetzel & Orbie, 2015). The next chapter looks 
at whether this is indeed the case in terms of 
what the EU does to support democracy abroad.  
 
c. How does the EU do 
democracy assistance?  
Thus far this article has outlined the scholarly 
agreement that EU thinking on democracy 
assistance is informed by a somewhat liberal, 
but fuzzy and technical understanding and that 
this in turn influences the EU narrative. Indeed, 
it is agreed that the EU, in its policy documents, 
talks  of democracy assistance in depoliticised, 
technical and non-confrontational terms.  
 
This section will further explore the third and 
final dimension of substance, namely, 
‘implementation’. As indicated by Sarah Bush 
(cf. supra), democracy assistance has many 
aspects. However, for the purpose of this 
exercise, this paper limits itself to civil society. 
Linking to the democracy-development 
discussion as described above, civil society is a 
means through which democracy and 
development can be promoted, and in fact, it 
could be argued that through civil society 
conflicts or synergies between democracy and 
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development promotion goals most sharply 
materialise (cf. Pace 2009).   
 
Before discussing the ‘substance’ of the EU’s 
democracy assistance through civil society, it is 
worthwhile clarifying the civil society ‘object’ 
and how it has been defined in the literature. 
Like democracy, civil society is a contested 
concept characterised by “acute definitional 
fuzziness” (cf. Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech 
2014:15). Indeed, civil society can be 
approached as a space, a set of values or norms, 
a mode of interaction, or as an actor. Focusing 
on the ‘actorness’ of civil society allows to 
identify its political and social functions, as well 
as its contribution to democracy or 
democratisation. Within this functionalist 
approach, following Hahn-Fuhr & Worschech 
(2014), we can discern two major theories: the 
republican (or integrative) view sees civil 
society as complementary to the state, 
providing basic socialisation functions among 
which democratic socialisation, participation, 
the generation of social capital as well as the 
support for structural economic reforms. The 
liberal (or dichotomous) view, on the other 
hand, considers civil society as a counterpart to 
the state, fulfilling a ‘watchdog’ role in 
checking and limiting state power, defending 
citizens’ rights and disseminating information 
that empowers citizens in the collective pursuit 
of their interests and values. These particular 
views on civil society’s “ideal role” in a 
democratic society are reflected in the 
assumptions that inform external democracy 
promoters’ strategies of support to civil society 
in third countries. As we will show in the 
remainder of the section, the EU’s support of 
civil society could as well be defined ‘fuzzy’, 
since the EU mobilises both a liberal and an 
integrative view of civil society. Notably, the 
scholarly consensus points to the fact that, while 
the former  view (in line with a democratising 
approach – cf. supra) might be emphasised in the 
EU narrative, it is the latter (closer to a 
developmentalist approach) which  is mostly 
pursued in practice.  
 
The literature agrees that, within the EU’s 
democracy assistance agenda, support to civil 
society comes with a series of positive normative 
assumptions. The EU, as other external 
democracy promoters, emphasises a positive 
correlation between a vibrant civil society and a 
transition to and consolidation of democracy (cf. 
Beichelt, Hahn, Schimmelfennig & Worschech 
2014; Knodt & Jüneman 2007; Bob 2017; Balfour 
2006; Hurt 2006). Accordingly, following the 
basic assumption that processes of 
democratisation have to grow from within, 
direct support to civil society in third countries 
provides a domestic avenue for democratic 
change. Moreover, civil society is generally 
considered as a ‘force for good’: Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are assumed not to have 
vested interests (= they are transparent) and to 
be able to promote reforms more effectively 
from below (Marchetti 2017; Hahn-Fuhr & 
Worschech 2014). Thanks to their non-profit and 
local orientation, they are also ideally suited for 
the delivery of social services (complementing 
local and national government provisions) and 
they may contribute to social economy and 
sustainable growth at the grassroots level, 
representing and defending vulnerable and 
socially excluded groups (Axyonova & Bossuyt 
2016; Pierobon 2017). In other words, support to 
civil society is not a goal per se: the EU sees civil 
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society as instrumental, and emphasises the 
associational activity and potential of CSOs in 
reinforcing democracy and delivering services 
(Axyonova & Bossuyt 2016; Kurki 2011a; 
Colombo & Shapovalova 2017, Muehlehnoff 
2015).  
 
In its policy documents, the EU defines civil 
society in a broad sense, as “all non-State, not-
for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-
violent, through which people organise 
themselves to pursue shared objectives and 
ideals, whether political, cultural, social or 
economic” (Council 2012). The involvement of 
civil society first appeared in the EU’s internal 
governance agenda in the beginning of the 
2000s EC 2001), as a palliative for the EU’s own 
‘democratic deficit’ (Saurugger 2008). Over the 
years, civil  society has increasingly become a 
central element within the EU’s democracy 
promotion efforts (Marchetti & Tocci 2013; 
Pierobon 2017; Pospieszna & Weber 2017). 
Indeed, the 2011 Joint Communication on 
‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of 
EU External Action: Towards a more ‘effective 
approach’ (EC 2011b) opened up a discussion on 
how to make the EU’s external policy on human 
rights and democracy more active, more 
coherent and more effective. Published a few 
months after the beginning of the Arab Spring, 
the communication addressed the need for a 
greater EU involvement with civil society in 
third countries, which was further echoed in the 
2012 communication on ‘The roots of 
Democracy and sustainable development: 
Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in 
external relations’. The resulting Council 
Conclusions specifically state that ‘an 
empowered civil society is a crucial component 
of any democratic system and is an asset in 
itself. Civil society actors can foster pluralism 
and contribute to more effective policies, 
equitable development and inclusive growth’ 
(Council 2012). Furthermore, since 2011, CSOs 
are formally recognised as ‘autonomous 
development actors in their own right’ and as 
such, the EU agreed to further strengthen the 
involvement of CSOs in the EU programming 
cycle at all stages, particularly if ‘partner 
countries show only limited commitment to 
[change]’ (EC 2011c, emphasis added). Thus, 
civil society support has also become popular in 
the EU’s narrative as a bottom-up democracy 
promotion strategy capable to bypass and avoid 
direct confrontation with third-country 
governments (Pierobon 2017). 
 
In reality, however, CSO participation in policy 
processes is mainly to provide expertise, as 
consultations most often remain on a formal 
level and are not followed by political action on 
the EU’s side (Fiedlschuster 2016). Indeed, while 
CSOs are increasingly included as stakeholders in 
policy-making and their role as watchdogs is 
enhanced (Bridoux &Kurki 2015; Fiedlschuster 
2016), the EU’s focus on civil society in aid 
implementation is primarily seen in terms of a 
governance approach aiming at enhancing aid 
effectiveness, rather than democracy (Börzel & 
Hackenesh 2015; Del Biondo 2011b; Shapovalova 
& Youngs 2014; Muehlenhoff 2015). It was argued 
in the previous section that EU participatory 
development is based on aid efficiency: in the 
case of EU support to civil society, this means 
that CSOs are believed to deliver services 
normally provided by the state in a more cost-
effective and the accountable manner (Del
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Biondo 2011b)4. Moreover, despite the (liberal) 
narrative whereby civil society is seen as a 
driver of reforms and democratisation, in the 
actual practices the EU has for a long time 
mainly supported a narrow, neo-liberal form of 
civil society that is considered to be a politically 
neutral mediator and a service provider 
(namely, NGOs5), while overlooking politically 
significant actors of democratisation. This has 
had two main implications: on the one hand, 
what the EU purported to be politically 
significant democracy assistance in practice 
seemed to function as apolitical technical 
support (Fagan 2011). On the other hand, the 
mainstream EU support to civil society is seen 
as going hand in hand “with a development 
paradigm that continues to be market-led” 
(Hurt 2006, cited in Axyonova & Bossuyt 2016). 
For instance, in the region covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, it is 
acknowledged that the EU has more 
substantially supported CSOs working on issues 
such as internal market, environment or 
migration policy rather than their counterparts 
focusing on democracy or human rights reforms 
(Johansson-Nogués 2017:439). Also, the 
instrument supporting Non-State Actors and 
Local Authorities (NSA-LA) has only marginally 
supported democracy. Its primary focus is on 
the facilitation of social and economic 
development. While the NSA-LA seeks to foster 
civil society participation in policy-making, the 
main focus is less on institution building but on 
poverty reduction and service delivery (Axynova 
                                             
4. See again the (neo)liberal argument: civil society support is managed on the basis of neoliberal assumptions with regard to the role of civil society actors 
and neoliberal management practices (cf. Kurki 2011b; Reynaert 2011; Muhlenhoff 2015). 
5. In the EU’s neo-liberal understanding of democracy promotion, NGOs are said to play a crucial role in pluralising the institutional arena and strengthening 
civil society, thus aiding democratisation. However, academic reviews on external support to NGOs have problematised and nuanced these claims, arguing 
that such professionalised organisations, focused more on donor-funded service provision than on political activities, can even undermine democratic 
developments (Mercer, 2002). 
& Bossuyt 2016; Shapovalova & Youngs 2012; 
Bridoux & Kurki, 2015). 
  
Finally, the tension between the EU’s democracy 
and development promotion goals is particularly 
evident in the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). By also 
funding CSOs that seek to oppose the state in 
case the latter violates fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the EIDHR could be seen as responding 
to a dichotomous view of civil society and to a 
democratising approach (Axyonova & Bossuyt 
2016). In reality, while the EIDHR acknowledges 
CSOs as a source of democratic ownership and 
recognises ‘CSOs’ right of initiative to identify 
and respond to emerging needs, to put forward 
visions and ideas’ (EC 2014, p. 11), EIDHR 
projects remain mainly ideologically and 
politically neutral. They are not characterised in 
political terms, are rather adverse to explicitly 
political language (Kurki 2011b, 356) and address 
rather ‘uncontroversial’ issues (Bicchi & Voltolini 
2013).  
 
Thus, the EU approach through the different civil 
society support instruments “does not encourage 
the NGOs to see themselves as political actors in 
the democratisation process” (Muehlenhoff 
2014:104). Instead, it renders them technical 
service providers without undermining the 
state’s stability and legitimacy (Axyonova and 
Bossuyt 2016) which finally confirms Sara Bush’s 
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(2015) classification of EU civil society support 
as a regime-compatible type of democracy 
assistance.  
 
However, the establishment, in 2013, of the 
European Endowment for Democracy (EED) 
marks a potential shift towards a more 
“politicised” EU approach to civil society 
support, in that CSOs are increasingly 
considered as viable political partners 
(Fiedlschuster 2016). Indeed, the goal is to 
make funding accessible not only to officially 
registered NGOs but also to political parties, 
individual human rights defenders6 and 
grassroots initiatives that are not supported by 
other donors or under other EU aid instruments 
(Colombo & Shapovalova 2017; Teti et al. 2013; 
Tordjman 2017). However, the EED’s 
geographical scope is mostly limited to the 
European Neighbourhood region, and its 
contribution in terms of direct financial 
allocation to civil society remains very marginal 
(Tordjman 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
6. The more recent launch, in 2016, of an EU Comprehensive Human Rights Defenders mechanism, managed by a consortium of 12 independent 
international   NGOs and operating worldwide, goes into the same direction of a more ‘political’ approach to democracy and human rights promo tion 
(European Commission 2015). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper, we defined literary consensus as 
a common denominator that presents itself 
throughout different arguments and 
researchers, and through time. We found that 
although there is difficulty in agreeing on the 
object of research itself, namely liberal ‘fuzzy’ 
democracy, there can be found scholarly 
agreement on the underlying conceptual, 
discursive and implementation dimensions of 
EU democracy assistance. Indeed, for each of 
the three dimensions it has become clear that 
literature in general points to a common 
thread: while the concept of liberal democracy 
assistance may seem political in nature, 
meaning that pursuing liberal democracy 
abroad seeks to challenge the status quo, in 
reality this is done through less confrontational 
methods and priority is given to stable, 
technical and depoliticised solutions. 
 
More specifically, we indicated that literature 
agrees the EU thinks of democracy assistance in 
a process-oriented manner. Democracy as such 
is to be developed in stages, primarily through 
addressing socio-economic and developmental 
objectives. This approach echoes the EU’s own 
experience with social and economic post 
World-War integration, which in turn also 
influences the EU democracy assistance 
narrative. Indeed, despite the fact that the EU 
has cautiously broadened the political scope of 
its democratic discourse, in reality literature 
points to the fact that this narrative has 
remained technical, depoliticised and 
uncontroversial. Finally, this technical 
inclination is also reflected in the EU’s 
implementation of democracy assistance through 
civil society. Namely, while at first glance civil 
society is portrayed as a crucial driver of 
democratic reforms and a prime EU partner in 
bottom-up democratisation processes, in 
practice its role has remained non-
confrontational and even complementary to the 
state – or at least according to literature.  
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The European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) was 
created in 2008 by EU members states and non-for-
profit organisations keen to solidify European 
support for democracy abroad. Yet much has 
changed since the late 2000s both in terms of the 
policy environment inside Europe and the changing 
nature of political systems around the world.  
 
As a result, EPD and its members are conducting 
a participatory review of European democracy 
support over the course of 2018-2019. The research 
is designed to take stock of European democracy 
support by focusing on the policies of practitioner 
organisations, the European Union and European 
governments in order to draw lessons for the future.  
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